showSidebars ==
showTitleBreadcrumbs == 1
node.field_disable_title_breadcrumbs.value ==

PhD Dissertation Proposal by LIU Ximing | When Keystroke Meets Password: Attacks and Defenses

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

 
 

 

When Keystroke Meets Password: Attacks and Defenses

 

 

 

 


 

 

 


 


 

 

 

 

LIU Ximing


 

PhD Candidate

School of Information Systems

Singapore Management University

 


 


 

FULL PROFILE

 


Research Area


 

 

Dissertation Committee


 

Chairman


 

 

Committee Members


 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 

 


Date


 

August 23, 2018 (Thursday)

 

 


Time


 

10.00am - 11.00am

 

 


Venue


 

Meeting Room 4.4, Level 4,

School of Information Systems,

Singapore Management University,

80 Stamford Road

Singapore 178902

 

 

We look forward to seeing you at this research seminar.


 

 


 


 


 


 

 

 

About The Talk


 

Password is a prevalent mean used for user authentication in pervasive computing environments due to its simplicity and convenience. However, the use of passwords has its intrinsic problems because of the involvement of keystroke. In this dissertation proposal, we propose the first user-independent inter-keystroke timing attack on PINs. Our attack method is based on an inter-keystroke timing dictionary built from a human cognitive model whose parameters can be determined by a small amount of training data on any users. Keystroke timing information can also be used to protect users' accounts. We further propose Typing-Proof, a usable, secure and low-cost two-factor authentication mechanism. It eliminates the user-phone interaction in the most cases and can effectively defend against the existing attacks to recent 2FA mechanisms.

 

 

 

Speaker Biography


 

LIU Ximing is a PhD candidate in Cybersecurity at School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University. He is advised by Associate Professor Yingjiu Li and AXA Chair Professor Robert H. Deng. In his PhD study, he focuses on user authentication and side-channel attacks.