Pre-Conference Talk by TAN Pang Jin | Stable and Fair Cost Allocation in Platform-Enabled LCL Consolidation

Many logistics platforms enable collaboration between agents to reduce costs, but determining fair pricing remains challenging when agents have pre-existing partnerships. This paper introduces a cooperative game theory framework to model platform-mediated collaboration, modeling the platform as an additional player. We present a novel characteristic function that distinguishes between partial collaborations (existing relationships) and full collaborations (platform-enabled). Using Shapley value, we derive fair cost allocations and platform charges that reflect each participant's contribution. We address stability concerns through an optimization model that minimizes platform subsidies while preventing profitable deviations. The framework is demonstrated through an application in freight forwarding for Less-than-Container Load (LCL) consolidation, showing how it balances participant incentives with platform revenue across varying collaboration structures and network sizes. This is a pre-conference talk for Joint International Conference on Computational Logistics and EURO Mini Conference on Maritime Optimization and Logistics 2025. 

This is a Pre-Conference talk for Joint International Conference on Computational Logistics and EURO Mini Conference on Maritime Optimization and Logistics 2025 (ICCL 2025).